PESTICIDES: PROBLEMS FACING THE
INDUSTRY IN SUBMITTING PROPRIETARY
SCIENTIFIC DATA TO AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States pesticide firms confront several troublesome problems
with regard to scientific data, both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, these firms face two main questions in this area: First,
what is the scope of the Environmental Protection Agency's [hereinafter EPA] right to disclose to the public sensitive scientific data
submitted to the EPA by these companies for the sole purpose of
registering a pesticide?' Second, what is the proper method of calculating the compensation owed to a "data-generating" pesticide firm
by another pesticide firm that uses that data to register a pesticide
with the EPA? 2 On the international level, pesticide firms face the
problem of preventing scientific data which the firms submit to
international organizations from falling into the hands of a foreign
competitor or a foreign government. The foreign competitor could
use this data to register the pesticide in foreign countries. 3 A foreign

The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), ch. 125, 61
Stat. 163 (1947) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -1 36 y (1988), covers the procedures
for registering a pesticide for commercial use within the United States. According
to FIFRA, the EPA shall make available to the public all safety tests relating to a
pesticide now registered or previously registered, except information on manufacturing, quality control, methods used to measure any inert ingredient, or the identity
or percentage of any deliberately added inert ingredient; but these excepted types
of information also must be made available if the Administrator of the EPA deems
that the public disclosure of such information is necessary to protect against unreasonable risk to health or environment. 7 U.S.C. 136h(d). The EPA, however,
has not always been forthcoming with the disclosure of such information to the
public. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
2 Under FIFRA, an applicant must make an offer of reasonable compensation
to the original data submitter. Failing agreement between the parties, the matter
must be submitted to binding arbitration. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D). However, neither
FIFRA nor its legislative history makes clear what constitutes reasonable compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
1 See R. BoARDMAN, PESTICIDES IN WORLD ACRicuLTuRL 69 (1986) [hereinafter
BOARDMAN]. See also infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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government, on the other hand, could use this data as a basis for
blacklisting the compound or the pesticide company involved.
At the root of these controversies lies the following scenario. A
large United States pesticide manufacturef may spend millions of
dollars yearly on gathering the required data for registering a single
pesticide and for other administrative purposes involving that pesticide. Not surprisingly, the manufacturer considers this data, whether
trade secret or not, as its proprietary interest. As with. any private
property, the manufacturer insists it has the right to control the access
of others to the data.
Under present federal law, each pesticide manufacturer that seeks
to register a pesticide for commercial use must, among other things,
submit adequate data to the EPA in support of registration of that
pesticide. 4 The EPA is required to reveal to the public the results of
safety studies performed on any pesticide that is currently, or was
once, registered.5 By enacting this legislation, Congress sought to
provide the public with the means to assess for themselves the value
of these studies. 6 However, the pesticide industry has attempted to
effect the repeal of this legislation both in court and by lobbying
pressure. 7 Pesticide manufacturers fear that commercial misuse of the
safety data could occur if the data falls into the public's hands.' At
present, the EPA will disclose health and safety data to a member
of the public provided that the latter signs an affirmation to the
effect that he or she will do nothing to pass the data on to a
multinational or foreign firm. Yet public interest groups and industry
groups have not reached agreement as to what are the limits for such
an affirmation. 9 The future of this legislation, then, remains uncertain.
Also under U.S. law, a firm seeking to register a pesticide that
has already been registered may be allowed to use the data submitted
by the original registrant in support of the of the latter firm's application for registration. I0 The issue may then arise whether the so-

7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988).
Id. at § 136h(d).

6 Safir and Davis, Disclosure of Pesticide Data: A Viable Compromise at Last?,
12 ENVTL. L. REP. 15017 (1982) [hereinafter Safir].
id. at 15018-22.
Id. at 15018.
9 See, e.g., NCAMP Objects to Data Release Plan; Roundup Data Probably
First Out, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS [hereinafter PESTICIDE NEWS], Aug.

8, 1984, at 22-23. See also infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
10 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D). See infra text accompanying notes 55-63 and 76-79.

19891

PESTICIDES DATA

called "follow-on registrant" should have to pay the original registrant
for the opportunity costs that the follow-on registrant avoids by
gaining immediate market access, for the actual costs of developing
the test data", or according to a system based on market share of
the pesticide ingredients in question.' 2 This issue remains unsettled.
The success of international efforts to regulate pesticides hinges in
large part on the willingness of individual pesticide firms to submit
proprietary data in furtherance of such regulation." The Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues [hereinafter CCPR] which is a subsidiary
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission [hereinafter CODEX], a United
Nations organization under the auspices of the World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO] and the Food and Agricultural Organization, is the main international forum on pesticide residues
matters. 4 United States pesticide manufacturers are willing to participate in the work of the CCPR if for no other reason than to
seek a harmonization of divergent pesticide laws so as to facilitate
the international trade in pesticides. 5 Two groups of scientists, collectively known as the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues [hereinafter
JMPR], have set acceptable levels of human intake of given pesticides
and recommended maximum acceptable levels of pesticide residues
on certain foods.' 6 Member states of CODEX are obliged to make
a good faith effort to incorporate the Codex-recommended levels into
their national regulatory systems and at the very least to consider
17
the Codex levels when setting their own levels.

1 Coll, Determining Compensation for Subsequent Use of Test Data Under
FIFRA: A Value-Based or Cost-Based Standard?, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 193, 193194 (1986) [hereinafter Coll). See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.

3 See BOARDMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
See Frawley, Codex Alimentarius - Food Safety - Pesticides, 42 FOOD DRUG

14

CosM. L.J. 168, 173 (1987) (The author describes the CCPR as "the international
risk management team for pesticide residues").
t BOARDMAN, supra note 3, at 105.
6 See WORKING WITH THE JMPR AND THE CCPR - A GIFAP MANUAL FOR
THE AGROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY [hereinafter GIFAP MANUAL] 7-8 (1988) (available
from GIFAP, Brussels, Belgium).
'" The CODEX standards do not require government acceptance since CODEX
is not a regulatory body. However, member states of CODEX are under a treaty
obligation to make their best efforts to accept these standards. See, Kimbrell, Codex
Alimentarius Food Standards and Their Relevance to U.S. Standards, FOOD TECHNOLOGY 93, 94 (June, 1982). As of mid-1988, CODEX had 134 member nations
including the United States. GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY CODEX MEETING, May 12-13,
1986 (Arlington, VA) (updated version) 6.
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Usually, the manufacturer(s) of a pesticide must submit adequate
data to CODEX before the JMPR can examine the pesticide. 8 For
many years, pesticide manufacturers from the United States and elsewhere were very reluctant to submit data to any international body,
including CODEX. These firms feared that this data would fall into
the hands of foreign governments and/or foreign competitors, and that
another company would use this data to register the pesticide abroad.' 9
As a result of an agreement [hereinafter Agreement] regarding data
security reached in 1983 between the Groupement International des
Associations Nationales de Fabricants de Produits Agrochimiques
[hereinafter GIFAP], the pesticide industry group officially recognized
by CODEX 20 , and the International Programme on Chemical Safety
[hereinafter IPCS], United States pesticide manufacturers seem assured of proper safeguarding of their data. 2' Yet a few problems
remain. For instance, the JMPR makes annual reports which are
published and widely read. Although a manufacturer is asked by the
JMPR to indicate in advance what parts of its data constitute trade
secrets, and trade secrets are not disclosed in these reports 22, a competitor could conceivably use the summary of the data published
along with the reports to register the pesticide in another country 23 .
This note will examine the interests of pesticide manufacturers vis d
vis their proprietary data submitted to international organizations (specifically the CCPR) and how these interests are presently accommodated.
Federal pesticide law will serve as background material for this inquiry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Law on Pesticide Data Disclosure and Data
Compensation.
1.

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1947

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1947
(FIFRA) established the requirement that prospective licensees of a
pesticide submit to the Secretary of Agriculture the product's chemical
formula and data to support the licensing of that pesticide if the

BoARDMA,

20

GIFAP MANuAL, supra note 16, at 36.

21 Id. at 21.
22

Id. at 30.
at 16.

23 Id.

supra note 3, at

59.

'1

19 Id. at 69.
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Secretary should so require.2 4 FIFRA has always forbidden the government from disclosing the chemical formula of a currently or
previously registered pesticide to the public2 5 . Yet, in its original
version FIFRA did not prohibit the USDA from disclosing test data
submitted by one applicant for registration to a later applicant. In
fact, the USDA appears to have routinely considered submitted test
data from one applicant in deciding whether to license another applicant for the same pesticide or for a different pesticide having the
26
same active ingredient(s).
2.

Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972

Not until the enactment in 1972 of the Federal Pesticide Control
Act 2 7 (FEPCA) were the rules on data use tightened. Under this

statute, registration of a pesticide became contingent upon the manufacturer showing that the pesticide would not cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment. 28 Most importantly, FEPCA set
up a data licensing scheme pursuant to which one of two conditions
would have to be met before the EPA could release the data to
another applicant for registration purposes. First, the original registrant would have to give its permission for the follow-on applicant
to use the former's data. Alternatively, the applicant would have to
provide reasonable compensation to the registrant before the data
could be used, and such data could not contain trade secrets or
commercial or financial information. 29 The Administrator of the EPA

2 Currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988). The United States Department
of Agriculture [hereinafter USDA], was responsible for regulating pesticides until
1970. Upon its creation in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] was
given this task. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 Compilation),
reprinted in Appendix to 5 U.S.C. at § 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
However, the task of regulating pesticide residues in meat and poultry products
remains with the USDA. Id.
21 Current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b) (1988).
26 The Supreme Court expressed this belief in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1009-10, n.14 (1984). An active ingredient (in the case of a pesticide) is
defined as an ingredient which will prevent, destroy, repel, or mitigate any pest. 7
U.S.C. § 136(a)(1) (1982).
27 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat.
979 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)) (FEPCA). Even
though FEPCA represented a major amendment of FIFRA, FEPCA and its subsequent amendments are still referred to as FIFRA.
28 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)(D), (1988). The applicant still must show that the
composition of the pesticide warrants the proposed claims for it and that the labelling
comply with FIFRA. Id. at (A), (B).
29 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988).
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[hereinafter Administrator] was to determine what would be reasonable compensation under the circumstances after providing to both
parties notice and an opportunity for hearing. Only the original
registrant could appeal the Administrator's decision, and an appeal
had to be brought in federal district court.3 0
Under FEPCA, the categories of registrant-supplied data that the
EPA was prohibited from disclosing to an applicant or to the public
were broadened. In addition to chemical formulas of pesticides, the
EPA could not disclose trade secrets, commercial information and
financial information. 1 At the heart of the EPA's right under FEPCA
to disclose scientific data to others is the right of the original submitter
of the data to mark those portions of the submitted data that constitute trade secrets or any other protected information.3 2 Although
the Administrator could under no circumstances make public a submitter's trade secrets, commercial information or financial information, it could release information relating to product formulas if
necessary to carry out FEPCA.33 Also, under FEPCA, for the EPA
to release any data that it believes, contrary to the submitter's representations, to be unprotected, the EPA must notify the registrant
of its intent to do so. The registrant may then seek a declaratory
judgment from a district court as to whether such information is
34
indeed protected.
The FEPCA also addressed other new issues of information disclosure. For example, FEPCA mandated that pesticide manufacturers
submit to the EPA certain information relating to the requirement
that EPA registration be obtained for establishments where pesticides
are produced.3 5 This information included the types and amounts of
pesticides currently produced, pesticides produced during the past
30 Id.

at § 136a(c).
FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 10(b), 86 Stat. 973, 989 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136h (1988)).
32 FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 10(a), 86 Stat. 973, 989 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(a) (1988)).
FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 10(b), 86 Stat. 973, 989 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b) (1988)). In addition, FEPCA requires that the
Administrator upon registering a pesticide reveal to the public the data he relied on
in making the registration statement and any other data he deems relevant to his
decision. FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 3(c)(2), 86 Stat. 973, 979 (1972) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2) (1988)).
14 7 U.S.C. § 136h(c) (1988).
3, FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 7(c), 86 Stat. 973, 987 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136e (1988)).
31

13
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year, and those sold or distributed during the past year.3 6 Such
information was subject to the same restrictions on disclosure as trade
secrets and commercial and financial information. 7 Also, FEPCA
stipulated that the EPA may not require registrants to submit financial
data, sales data other than shipment data, pricing data, personnel
data, or research data (except that relating to registered pesticides or
pesticides sought to be registered). 3"
3. FIFRA Extension of 1975
An extension to FIFRA, enacted in 197519, provided some further
elaboration of the law on data use and compensation. Only data
submitted to the EPA by a registrant on or after January 1, 1970
and which involves an application for registration or reregistration
submitted after October 21, 1972 was covered by the Extension.
Disclosure of such data would be subject to the condition that a
future applicant must obtain permission for its use from the registrant
or must offer to pay to the latter reasonable compensation for its
use.40 While under FEPCA only the original registrant could appeal
a determination of the Administrator as to what constitutes to reasonable compensation for a given set of data, 4' under the 1975 Extension either the registrant or the new applicant could appeal the
Administrator's decision. 42 Finally, whereas FEPCA provided that the
district court could not find the amount of reasonable compensation
to be lower than the Administrator's figure, 43 the 1975 Extension
removed this limitation on the district court."4

36

Id.

37 Id.
38 FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 8(a), 86 Stat. 973, 987 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136f(a) (1988)).

39 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, extension, Pub. L. No.
84-140, 89 Stat. 751 (1975) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6y (1982))
(1975 Extension).
40

1975 Extension, Pub. L. No. 84-140 § 12, 89 Stat. 751, 755 (1975) (codified

as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988)).
41 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42

1975 Extension, Pub. L. No. 84-140 § 12, 89 Stat. 751, 755 (1975 (codified

as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988)).
43 FEPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 3(c)(D), 86 Stat. 973, 979 (1972) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §. 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988)). " 1975 Extension, Pub. L. No. 84-140 § 12, 89 Stat. 751, 755 (1975) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1988)).
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4. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978
The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 (FPA)45 rendered more complex
the FIFRA provisions dealing with scientific data, and represents the
present law in this area. 6
First, the FPA amended the "trade secret" provisions so that the
Administrator may disclose to the public safety studies on pesticides
and their ingredients. Yet the Administrator may not reveal to the
public information regarding manufacturing or quality control methods, the details of testing methods that gauge the quantity of any
deliberately added inert ingredient of a pesticide, or the identity or
47
percentage of any inert ingredient deliberately added to a pesticide.

Information on production, distribution, sale, or inventories of a

48
pesticide may be disclosed to the public under certain circumstances.
The FPA provides a detailed scheme of notification to the data/
information submitter, and judicial review, of any EPA decision to
divulge the former's "trade secrets" to the public. 49
Contractors, federal employees, and foreign and multinational pesticide firms are within the scope of certain subsections of the "trade
secret" provision. Any trade secret information may be revealed to
contractors if disclosure is necessary for the performance of work in
connection with the FPA.5 0 Criminal penalties are provided for federal
employees who willfully disclose material the disclosure of which the

Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at
as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1 36 y (1982)) (FPA).
However, legislative development has since occured in one specific area of data
compensation. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988))
(1988 Amendments) addressed certain problems facing the reregistration of pesticides.
Reregistration involves the EPA's determination that an active ingredient of a registered pesticide lacks adequate data to support the continued registration of that
pesticide. The pesticide manufacturer must then provide additional data according
to the EPA's specifications so that the pesticide can remain registered. H.R. Rep.
No. 100-939, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Aorcmw. NEws 3474, 3477. The 1988 Amendments provided mandatory fee schedules
setting out amounts owed the original data submitter by follow-on registrants for
pesticide active ingredients undergoing reregistration. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(h) (1988).
7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(l) (1988). However, the Administrator may reveal such
information to the public if he has determined that disclosure is necessary to protect
against injury to health or environment. Id.
Id. at § 136h(d)(2). Such information may be disclosed in relation to a public
proceeding held to determine if the pesticide causes unreasonable adverse effects to
man or the environment if the Administrator deems that disclosure is in the public
interest. Id.
49 Id.
at § 136h(d)(3).
10Id. at § 136h(e).
41

41

41
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employee knows to be prohibited by the FPA.51 The Administrator
may not knowingly reveal to foreign or multinational pesticide manufacturers, to any of their employees, or to any other person connected
with such manufacturers information submitted by an applicant or
registrant under the FPA.5 2 Also, the Administrator must obtain an
affirmation from any person intending to inspect data to the effect
that the latter does not intend to deliver the data and will not
negligently cause the data to be delivered to a foreign or multinational
pesticide manufacturer. 5" Furthermore, the Administrator must inform
the registrant or applicant of the names and affiliations of any persons
54
to whom "trade secret" data are disclosed.
Second, the FPA in effect divided submitted test data into three
categories: 1) data submitted to support the application for the original
registration or the new use of a pesticide which is registered after
September 30, 1978 are protected by a 10-year "exclusive use" period
from the date of such registration" (in other words, the original data
submitter is protected against the use of his data by a follow-on
applicant for a ten-year period; also, the data submitter is entitled
to reasonable compensation for the use of his data for five more
years5 6); 2) data submitted after December 31, 1969 and before September 30, 1978 may be considered by the Administrator in support
of a follow-on application for the fifteen-year period following submission of the data only if the applicant obtains permission from or
offers reasonably to compensate the data submitter5 7 ; and 3) data
submitted to support the registration of a pesticide before January
1, 1970 may freely be considered by the Administrator in support of
follow-on applications.5 8 In a substantial departure from previous
law, the FPA requires that disputes arising between parties concerning

51

Id. at § 136h(f).

Id. at § 136h(g). Yet the Administrator may knowingly reveal such information
if the applicant or registrant has consented to its disclosure. Id.
32

53 Id.
14

Id.

" Id. at § 136a(c)(l)(D)(i). The 10 year "exclusive use" period does not apply
if the original data submitter gives his permission for follow-on registration. However,
such permission is not necessary in regard to "defensive data". Id. The term
"defensive data" refers to any additional data which the Administrator requires the
registrant to produce in order to sustain the registration of a pesticide. Coil, supra
note 11, at 200. See also FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(c)(2)(B) (1982).
36 Id. at § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii).
57 Id.
58 See id.
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compensation for data use be settled through binding arbitration by
the Federal Mediation and Concilliation Service. 9
Third, FPA addresses the issue of joint data development. 60 If a
pesticide has more than one registrant and the Administrator determines that additional data is required to maintain the registration of
that pesticide, the registrants may agree to jointly develop or to share
the costs of developing such additional data. 61 The parties must notify
the Administrator of their intent to agree. Yet, should the parties
fail to agree on any detail of the agreement by a statutorily specified
time, 62 any registrant may refer the matter to binding arbitration by
63
the Federal Mediation and Concilliation Service.
5.

Subsequent Developments

Following the enactment of FPA, controversies emerged in two
main areas regarding the FIFRA data provisions. The questions arose,
first, as to the circumstances under which the EPA may disclose
submitted health and safety test data to the public, and second, as
to what is the proper method for calculating the compensation owed
to the original data submitter by a follow-on applicant and by a
joint data developer?
Regarding the health and safety data, the Third Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the public disclosure provisions of FIFRA. 64 The
pesticide industry then resorted to other means to keep the EPA from
disclosing the submitted health and safety data to the public, including
injunctions and agreements with the EPA. 65 In early 1982, the National
Agricultural Chemicals Association [hereinafter NACA] supported a
bill to amend FIFRA by allowing the public access to the data only
in a reading room and only in the form of summaries. 6 The pesticide

19 Id. FPA provides detailed instructions as to the procedure of such arbitration
and the responsibilities of the Administrator following such arbitration. Id.
60 Id. at. § 136a(c)(2)(B).
61

Id.

Namely, sixty-one days after informing the Administrator of their intention to
agree. Id.
63 Id. In this situation, also, FPA provides elaborate instructions on the mode
of arbitration and duties of the Administrator. Id.
Mobay Chem. Corp. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419, 421-24 cert. denied 459 U.S.
62

61

988 (1982).

Safir, supra note 6, at 15020-21.
H.R. 566, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Congress failed to act on this bill.
NACA is an organization representing the interests of the United States pesticide
industry and especially the large pesticide manufacturers. See BOARDMAN, supra note
3, at 45.
63
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industry also sought administrative action from the EPA on this
proposal. But the EPA refused to adopt the proposal on the ground
that it lacked the authority to do S0.67 However, there is some evidence
that in a move to protect the interests of large pesticide firms, the
EPA then imposed a moratorium on all requests by the public for
access to pesticides data. 68
Because the EPA's alleged moratorium came under heavy fire from
public interest groups, the EPA agreed to release health and safety
data to the public, but on condition that the data requester sign a
so-called "affirmation of non-multinational status" form. 69 In 1984,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the FIFRA provisions regarding data disclosure to the public as constitutional, 7° and this
decision put further pressure on the EPA to perform these duties in
a fair manner. Both public interest groups and industry groups accepted, in principle, the EPA's use of the form but disagreed as to
7
its contents. '
Interestingly, public interest groups and an industry group reached
agreement in late 1985 on many of the EPA procedures for data
disclosure to the public. 72 However, this agreement which was drafted
as amendments to FIFRA died in Congress. As an indication of
present efforts to resolve some of the controversies regarding public
disclosure, a House bill entitled the FIFRA Amendments of 198771
provides the public with preregistration access to submitted data but
on the condition that such data is not removed from an EPA office
or the office of an appropriate state agency. 74 As an apparent concession to the public, the bill requires each pesticide manufacturer
to compile fact sheets containing certain health and safety infor-

67 Letter from John A. Todhunter to Dr. Jack D. Early, President, NACA (June
8, 1982), at 1.
" Safir, supra note 6, at 15022 (citing LEGAL TImEs OF WASHINGTON, Feb. 22,
1982 at 11).
69 PESTICIDE NEWS,

supra note 9, Aug. 8, 1984 at 22-3.

10 Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467. U.S. 986, 1000-12 (1984)
11See PESTICIDE NEWS, supra note 9, Aug. 8, 1984 at 22-23. For example, industry
groups favor a statement in the affirmation that the data receiver may not publish
any information it has received from the EPA except for brief excerpts or summaries
of that information. Public interest groups, on the other hand, want a statement
that the data receiver may publish as much information as is necessary to enable
public groups to engage in a meaningful evaluation of the pesticide concerned.
72 See PESTICIDE NEWS, supra note 9, Nov. 20, 1985 at 31.
11H.R. 2463, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
74 H.R. 2463 § 101(a)(F)(i).
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mation, to maintain fact sheets at its establishment, and to furnish
75
a copy to any person upon request.
The controversies regarding data compensation are still very much
alive after the enactment of the FPA despite the existence of federal
and arbitral decisions on the issue. One issue is settled beyond doubt.
In two cases, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FIFRA data compensation provisions, including the
requirement of submission to binding arbitration of disagreements
over the amount of compensation due. 76 Until recently, another issue
appeared to be resolved. A decision of the Federal Mediation and
Concilliation Service, Stauffer Chemical Co. v. PPG Industries which
held that an original data submitter should receive value-based compensation as opposed to cost-based compensation from a follow-on
applicant chose the more controversial of the two options. 7 Yet, in
another arbitral decision, the question arose, whether market share,
per capita share, or some other method of compensation should be
used among joint data submitters under FIFRA, but the arbitral panel
did not decide the question authoritatively, and instead merely provided certain factors to guide the parties in making a decision. 78 Most
recently, and in an apparent about-face, an arbitral panel in E.L Du
Pont de Nemours Co. v. Griffin Corp. held that market-share com-

1 H.R. 2463, § 201(a). The bill requires each manufacturer to compile a fact
sheet on each active ingredient of a pesticide. The fact sheet must contain the
chemical name, common name, trade name of any ingredient, and a summary of
pertinent health, safety, and environmental data on the ingredient. Id.
76 Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Prods., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). In Ruckelhaus, the Court held that the
use of data by a "follow-on" applicant without compensation to the original data
submitter does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 467 U.S. at 1000-20. In Thomas,
the Court held that the requirement that parties to a dispute regarding data compensation resort to binding arbitration does not violate Article III of the Constitution.
473 U.S. at 582-84.
11No. 16 199 077 82 Federal Mediation and Concilliation Service (June 28, 1983)
(Birch et al., Arb.). A value-based method of compensation takes into account the
amount of money a follow-on registrant saves by avoiding the delays that the
preparation of data for registration entails. On the other hand, a cost-based method
involves the fair apportionment of the costs of developing the scientific data, and
nothing more. One commentator estimates that the follow-on registrant in Stauffer
had to pay the original data submitter around 15.5 million dollars under the valuebased method as opposed to around 1.5 million dollars under the cost-based method.
Coil, supra note 11, at 217-19.
78 FMC Corp. v. Tricon Int'l, No 16 199 0033 84 G, American Arbitration
Association (Jan. 10, 1985) (Foy et al., Arb.) See Coll, supra note 11, at 222 for
a discussion of these factors.

1989]

PESTICIDES DATA

pensation, with some modifications, is the appropriate method of
7 9
data compensation.
A. Agreement for the Security of Proprietary Scientific Data
Submitted to the JMPR
The Agreement is divided into a preamble and nine items.80 Ac-

cording to the preamble, the Agreement will attempt to reconcile two
competing goals. On the one hand, industry strives to protect its
trade secrets and the products of its research, and to prevent any
data made accessible to others from falling into the hands of competitors. On the other hand, the JMPR requires complete data in
order to make its evaluations and publish summaries calculated to
reveal its reasoning in the evaluation process. Following is a rundown
of the more relevant portions of the Agreement.
ITEM I

The pratice of the JMPR with regard to the evaluation of pesticides
includes the examination of unpublished proprietary data supplied to
the JMPR by pesticide manufacturers.
ITEM 2
Industry is requested to provide all of the relevant data required
for a full evaluation. Only the JMPR will use this data. Manufacturers
should clearly identify all highly confidential data so as to ensure

79 No 16 171 0080 86, American Arbitration Association (Dec. 22, 1988) (Foy et
al., Arb.) This decision grants a market-share compensation to the original data
submitter based on the follow-on registrant's highest year of market share in the
first five years of the active ingredient in question. Drexel, Griffin Favored Over
Du Pont in Data Arbitration Decision, PESTICIDE NEWS, supra note 9, Dec. 28,
1988 at 24. Also, the arbitrators provide rules as to different types of data and
their eligibility for compensation. See id. Interestingly, a lawyer representing DuPont
in this action asserts that the principle of substantial compensation advocated by
Stauffer was upheld. He points out that the arbitrators rejected the follow-on
registrants' figure of $127,315 (based on cost-based compensation) and that the
market share approach which they adopted will yield at least $1.5 million of compensation to the original data submitter. Du Pont to Get About $1.5 Million from
Drexel, Griffin for Data, PESTICIDE NEWS, supra note 9, Jan. 4, 1989.
10GIFAP MANUAL, supra note 16, at 55-56. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. This agreement, as it appears in the GIFAP Manual, is titled "Policy
Statement by the Central Unit of the International Programme on Chemical Safety
(IPCS) on Procedures for The WHO Secretariat on Handling Unpublished Proprietary
Data Submitted from Manufacturers to the World Health Organization for Toxicological Evaluation to Be Undertaken by The Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide
Residues (JMPR)". Since the agreement appears in its entirety on pages 55 and 56
of the GIFAP Manual, no citations to specific provisions will be made in this note.
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that this data will not be published in a report. Any confidential
information that is not submitted but is necessary for a full evaluation
will be treated according to item 7.
ITEM

3

IPCS, on behalf of the JMPR, will ensure that data, once submitted, will be protected from unauthorized disclosure and that the
proper facilities for safeguarding the data will be in place. ITEM 4
So-called "temporary advisors" will be used prior to and during
JMPR sessions. 81 Temporary advisors work in their individual capacities as scientists, rather than as members of governments or
institutions.
ITEM

5

During the meetings of the JMPR, only the temporary advisors
who reviewed the data and the JMPR experts can make use of the
data.
ITEM 6

The temporary advisor will be instructed not to copy all or portions
of the unpublished proprietary data, and not to share or use the data
for any purposes other than his JMPR assignment. When he finishes
his assignment, the temporary advisor must return the data to the
Secretariat of the WHO [hereinafter Secretariat]. The temporary advisor must agree in writing to these conditions, and any evidence of
misconduct on the temporary advisor's part is grounds for his permanent dismissal from the JMPR program.

7
Individual representatives of pesticide manufacturers will meet with
the Chairman of the WHO [hereinafter Chairman] during the JMPR
meeting to discuss certain issues relating to their specific pesticides.
ITEM

At such a meetings, the representative is expected to answer questions
regarding the data submitted and, if required, provide oral information on trade secrets regarding the firm's manufacturing process.
Information that is gathered in this process and that pertains to a
certain pesticide will not be discussed with others.
ITEM 8

After the JMPR meeting, the unpublished proprietary data will be
held under security for much time as is necessary to complete all
JMPR tasks relating to that data. Then, the Secretariat will contact
the original data submitter to determine whether the latter would like
83Temporary advisors, among their other tasks, review the data and draft a
toxicological report on the pesticide. Id.
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to have the data destroyed (by shredding or burning) or returned to
him.
ITEM 9

If the Secretariat receives either questions on information in the
reports which require references to any unpublished proprietary data,
or requests for copies of any unpublished proprietary data, he must
discuss the matter with the original data submitter.
III.

ANALYSIS

Large United States pesticide manufacturers have strong reasons
to demand that their proprietary scientific data be subject to stringent
security measures when submitted to international organizations. The
present United States laws on pesticide data disclosure and compensation favor the interests of large pesticide manufacturers over those
of smaller pesticide manufacturers in some respects.8 2 Original data
submitters benefit from periods of exclusive use and from mandatory
compensation for registration data submitted to the EPA after 1969.83
Also, follow-on registrants must pay the original data submitter either
value-based compensation or market share compensation, depending
on whether Stauffer 4 or Du Pont85 is followed in the future. But
cost-based compensation which favors smaller pesticide firms has so
far been rejected.16 Under U.S. law, large manufacturers also enjoy
safeguards in public access to their data. According to current actions
of the EPA, the interests of pesticide manufacturers, especially those
manufacturers generating extensive data, are favored over the public's
right to know about the hazards of specific pesticides. That is, while
the EPA will disclose certain health and safety data to the public as
it is obligated to do under FIFRA, s7 it requires that the data requester

82 Large pesticide manufacturers have the resources to invent new pesticides and
develop the expensive data needed to register a pesticide. Smaller manufacturers, on
the other hand, typically lack these resources and so must register pesticides as
follow-on registrants. See Coll, supra note 11, at 193-94.
13 See supra notes 55-59 and 76-79 and accompanying text.
84 No. 16 199 077 82 (Federal Mediation and Concilliation Service (June 28, 1983)
(Birch et al., Arb.).
85 No 16 171 0080 86 American Arbitration Association (Dec. 22, 1988) (Foy et
al., Arb.).
86 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. "[W]hile arbitrators [look to]
previous arbitration findings in making their decisions, they are not bound by earlier
rulings." BNA, Inc., Chem. Reg. Rep., Jan. 6, 1989, at 1475 (statement of Stanley
Landfair, attorney for Du Pont). However, an attorney for Drexel, claims that the
arbitrators made clear that their findings should have precedential value. Id.
87 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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sign an affirmation that restricts the uses that the requester may
make of this data. 88 Finally, large pesticide firms are well protected
against the willful impermissible disclosure by federal employees of
submitted data, a protection that is enhanced by the availability of
criminal penalties for violations. And the Administrator is expressly
prohibited from disclosing protected data to any multinational or
foreign firm or to any person connected with such a firm.8 9
Apart from the favorable security protections of data submitted
by large United States pesticide manufacturers under FIFRA, a few
practical concerns warrant the insistence of these companies on strong
protections against unauthorized disclosure of their data submitted
to international organizations. These concerns of the pesticide industry
stem from the fact that the data that these firms submit to international pesticide authorities may come into the hands of foreign
governments that are members of the organizations. Such foreign
governments may then use the data in one of two ways that run
counter to the interests of the data submitter. First, the foreign
government may release the data to a competitor of the data submitter
and the competitor may use the data as a basis for registering the
pesticide in countries other than the United States. 9° The competitor
may even receive this data directly from the international organization,
for example, through a report published by the organization. 9 Second,
the foreign government may use the data as a basis for banning the
92
pesticide to which it relates or banning the manufacturer itself.
The remainder of this analysis will address one facet of the problems
facing United States pesticide manufacturers internationally with regard to their proprietary product data, namely, the problems they
face in submitting data to the CCPR. 93 Furthermore, the Agreement
will serve as a focal point of the discussion.
Unlike the situtation under national regulatory schemes in which
a pesticide manufacturer may at any time during the registration
process withdraw its application without prejudice, a request for the
evaluation of a pesticide by the JMPR, if withdrawn, may result in
prejudice to the company involved. 94 Hence, before a pesticide man-

88
'9

See supra text accompanying note 69.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.

10See BOARDMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
91See Id. at 69.
92 Id.

at 70.
93 See supra text accompanying note 14.
14 GIFAP MA
UA, supra note 16, at 16. For example, the JMPR may proceed
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ufacturer decides to submit a pesticide to JMPR review, he should
make certain that the benefits of JMPR review outweigh the risks.
As for the matter of proprietary data, the manufacturer should
consider several factors. Perhaps the most important consideration
is that regardless of whether or not a company wants to undergo a
JMPR review of one of its pesticides, such a review might take place
anyway. Proprietary data submitted by a competing firm or data
appearing in scientific publications may provide the basis for such a
review. A company should at all times be prepared to submit data
on any of its pesticides that have not already undergone a JMPR
review. Otherwise, the JMPR might conduct a full evaluation of a
pesticide without all the available data, and the results of such a
review might therefore be less advantageous to the company. 95 Another important consideration is that the quality of the JMPR decision
depends on the quantity and quality of the data submitted to that
body.

96

Two of the main tasks of the JMPR are to recommend a "maximum
residue limit" [hereinafter MRL] and to recommend an "acceptable
daily intake" [hereinafter ADI] for each pesticide it reviews. 97 However, the JMPR must have access to adequate data before it can
assign an ADI and an MRL for a pesticide. Because the JMPR
expects the data submitter to provide additional data if required to
complete a particular evaluation,9" it may be better for the manufacturer not to submit a pesticide for JMPR review unless the manufacturer is confident that it can produce adequate data within a

to evaluate a pesticide even if a company seeks to withdraw its request for a JMPR
evaluation. Prejudice could then result if, for instance, a country delays the registration of a pesticide because of passages in reports of the JMPR which the country

deems require further clarification. Any waste of time in the registration of a pesticide
could prove expensive for a manufacturer. Id.
91 Id. at 15.
9

See G. VETTORAZZI, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
118 (1980) [hereinafter VETTORAZZI].

FOOD REGULATORY

Toxi-

COLOGY

1 See GIFAP MANUAL, supra note 16, at 7. An ADI of a chemical is defined
as the daily intake which, during an entire lifetime, appears to be without appreciable
risk to the health of the consumer on the basis of all the known facts at the time
of the evaluation of the chemical by the JMPR. Id. at 2 (citing GUIDE TO CODEX

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING

PESTICIDE RESIDUES,

Part 1, 1984). An MRL is

defined as the maximum concentration of a pesticide residue resulting from the use
of a pesticide according to good agricultural practice that is recommended by CODEX
to be legally permitted or acceptable in or on a food, agricultural commodity, or
animal feed. Id. at 1 (citing GUIDE TO CODEX RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
PESTICIDE RESIDUES, PART 1, 1984).

91According to Item 7 of the Agreement.
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reasonable time. 99 If the amount of data submitted is inadequate,
but more appears to be forthcoming and there is no concern about
the safety of daily intakes of small amounts of the compound for a
limited period of time, a temporary ADI may be assigned to the
pesticide. 1°0 A manufacturer with inadequate data should inquire as
to what consequences a temporary-ADI or no-ADI result may have
on its national registration plans. 10 '
Another factor that has kept some manufacturers from submitting
data in support of a JMPR evaluation of a pesticide, and also one
that does not involve consideration of the Agreement, is the fear that
CODEX has opened its doors to Eastern Bloc countries. The presence
of Eastern Bloc countries in CODEX raises the possibility that political
issues could enter the data-submitting process.' 0 2 That is to say,
blacklisting could occur with certain compounds and/or pesticide
companies.' 0 3 Also, should the submitted data fall into the hands of
°4
these governments, they may not accord it the protection it deserves.'
Finally, a pesticide firm should consider the Agreement, how the
Agreement fits into the CODEX regime, and whether or not the
agreement provides satisfactory data security.
Because the Preamble to the Agreement states explicitly that the
Agreement recognizes the need for complete data to be accessible for
the evaluation and for summaries to be published that explain the
reasoning process used in the evaluations, the manufacturer should
assess the effect of these matters on the security of data submitted
to the JMPR. 05
Item 1 of the Agreement recognizes that the JMPR considers data
and information from all sources, including unpublished proprietary
data, in making its evaluations. All things being equal, the JMPR
gives greater weight to published scientific data than to unpublished
scientific data.106 The reasoning is that data which appears in scientific
journals has been scrutinized by editors and referees and has been

99 GIFAP MANUAL, supra note 16, at 20.

100See VETTORAZZI, supra note 96, at 119-20.

,o GIFAP MANUAL, supra note 16, at 20.
102 BOARm
, supra note 3, at 69-70. Among Eastern Bloc countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania are members. In addition, East Germany attends
CODEX sessions as an observer. Id. at 70.
103Id. at 70.
104 Id.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 114-117.
'06 VETTORAZZI, supra note 96, at 120.
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called into question by the data submitter's peers. 10 7 If unpublished
data is submitted, an expert must have supervised the tests and his
name must be disclosed to the JMPR. 108 The procedures of experiments conducted to produce the data must be identified in sufficient
detail to enable the JMPR to recreate the test conditions and check
the results if necessary. 109 Finally, the method in which the unpublished
scientific data was obtained must, under normal circumstances, comply with proper laboratory practices and the current standards of
scientific precision before the data will be acceptable." 0
According to Item 2, the manufacturer should mark any submitted
data which constitutes a trade secret so that this portion will not be
published in any report."' As an added safeguard for pesticide firms,
very sensitive information may be submitted directly to the Chairman
of the WHO. The Chairman will discuss this data with the JMPR
only in a general manner and only to clarify certain items. He will
then immediately destroy the data." 2 Further reasonable protection for
trade secret information is provided in Item 7. In short, if the Chairman
meets with an individual pesticide manufacturer and the manufacturer
gives to the Chairman oral reports on any trade secret matter, the
Chairman will not discuss this information with anyone else.
The conduct of temporary advisors in relation to the unpublished
proprietary data is the main concern of Items 4, 5, and 6. This part
of the Agreement may well be the part most in need of reconsideration
in the eyes of United States pesticide firms. Although Item 4 declares
that temporary advisors work as individuals rather than as industry
or government representatives, no assurance is given that such individuals could not in fact have ties to industry or the government.
Moreover, under Item 6, a temporary advisor who abuses the confidentiality of the data under his control is simply dismissed from the
JMPR program. Civil and/or criminal penalties would provide an
additional and reasonable deterrent for such abuse, given the potential
gravity of the consequences to pesticide firms; none are presently
provided for.

Id.
108Id.
107

109 Id.

See id. at 121.
"I Under these circumstances, a published report by the JMPR would probably
110

state that information on, for instance, the manufacturing process (a trade secret)
was available to the JMPR. No further information would be supplied. GIFAP
MANUAL, supra note 16, at 30.
112

Id.
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Finally, the Secretariat's duty under Item 9 to discuss with the
manufacturer any requests received for copies of the manufacturer's
unpublished proprietary data or for information from reports which
would entail references to this data provides an additional and welcome
assurance that such data will not fall into the wrong hands. As a
further security measure, the Agreement should require that the Secretariat inform the manufacturer before he releases such information
to the requesting party and then only with the manufacturer's permission, preferably in writing." 3
Other considerations as to whether a manufacturer should submit
data to the JMPR in support of an evaluation stem from the reports
published by the JMPR.1 4 Obviously, the data presented in these
reports could be used as the basis for a competitor to register a pesticide
in a foreign country or for a government to blacklist the pesticide or
the company that submitted the data. ,,5 These reports could also provide
a competitor with some knowledge of how the data submitting firm
handled a problem specific to the pesticide industry."16 The competitor
could then attain the same competitive advantage enjoyed by the data
submitter. Yet this problem is to some extent illusory in that many
governments, supposedly including the United States, make much of
the registration data submitted by a firm available to the public an7
yway.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, the work of the JMPR deserves the continued
support of the pesticide industry. The JMPR evaluations of pesticides

"I As an illustration of how the disclosure of unpublished proprietary data to
others by CODEX has been tightened over the years, one could examine the disclosure
of such data to bona fide scientists. CODEX has always given bona fide scientists,
upon request, copies of unpublished reports which the JMPR considered in its
evaluations. Yet in 1975, while reaffirming the right of scientists to receive this
information, CODEX prohibited access to confidential information. VETToRAZZI,
supra note 96, at 118-19.
114 For instance, see supra note 94.
" Publications known as the JMPR Report and Evaluations are published after
each JMPR Meeting. GIFAP MANuAL, supra note 16, at 16. The 1979 JMPR Report
specifically states that if an Evaluation relies on unpublished proprietary data, the
Evaluation should not form the basis of the registration of that pesticide if the socalled "me-too" registrant does not have proper authority to use such data. Id.
Id.
"I Id. For a discussion of the duties of the EPA in this regard, see supra notes
116

47-49 and accompanying text,
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provide the basis for pesticide registrations in many countries and the
acceptance by countries of the recommended ADIs and MRLs can
only lead to greater harmonization of pesticide standards. Pesticide
manufacturers should welcome such harmonization, because their costs
of manufacturing a pesticide so as to comply with many different
national standards would be lessened, and harmonization of pesticide
laws would tend to increase the areas where a given pesticide may be
sold. In short, pesticide firms should continue to submit the required
data to the JMPR to enable that body to carry out its evaluations.
While lending its support to CODEX and the JMPR, however, the
industry (as represented by GIFAP) should forge stronger alliances
with the CODEX bodies and member governments in an effort to
exact further guarantees that the proprietary data submitted to the
JMPR will not be used for improper purposes. For instance, GIFAP
should seek an agreement with member governments to the effect that
these governments will cancel any registration of a pesticide that is
based on raw data submitted to the JMPR, or information contained
in the JMPR Reports and Evaluations when that data or information
is being used without the permission of the data submitter. Such an
agreement should also prohibit a member government from blacklisting
a compound or company involved with the JMPR process unless good
cause is shown therefore.
The Agreement itself represents a big step towards proper security
for proprietary data submitted to the JMPR. Although there are no
known instances in which proprietary data submitted to the JMPR
has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized party because of a security
lapse at CODEXy 8 the Agreement helps to assure that such an incident
will not occur in the future. Yet from an industry standpoint GIFAP
should press the ICPS for a redrafting of the Agreement on a few
points. First, a new Agreement should provide a mechanism for selecting temporary advisors that would ensure that they are in no way
partial to industry or government and provide more stringent penalties
for a temporary advisor's negligent or willful disclosure of data to an
unauthorized party. Also, the Chairman should be required to obtain
the permission of the data submitter before releasing unpublished data
or references to such data to a third party. More precise security
measures afforded to proprietary data should spawn a greater will-

1,8

GIFAP MANuAL, supra note 16, at 21.
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ingness on the industry's part to cooperate with CODEX and the
JMPR.
Alexander R. Nemajovsky

